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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4), and Utah R. App. P. 42. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. As a matter of law and based upon undisputed material 
facts, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and thus correctly 
awarded defendants summary judgment. 
Although in reviewing summary judgment awards this Court 
must ordinarily consider the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellant, Culp 
Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990), when 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Court of 
Appeals reviews for correctness the legal conclusion of the trial 
court. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992); see 
also Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 
1979) (court evaluates whether moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law where there is no genuine dispute as to material 
issues of fact or where court assumes facts as contended by losing 
party). 
2. This Court should alternatively affirm summary judgment 
based upon undisputed facts and binding case law presented to the 
trial court below, although not forming a basis for the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds. 
This Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied 
on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 
(citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 
1992) ) . 
3. The trial court did not err in requiring plaintiff to pay 
for the costs of a transcript for this Court's review on appeal. 
Although no precedential case appears directly on point, 
the decision to award expenses or costs rests within the discretion 
of the trial court and should not be overturned absent a showing of 
a clear abuse of that discretion. Cf. T.S. Partnership v. Allred, 
877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1994) (determination of attorney fees 
within sound discretion of trial court and not overturned absent 
showing of clear abuse of discretion). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 provides in part: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be initiated unless and 
until the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. 
Other provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
including Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) require the party initiating 
a medical malpractice action to file a request for prelitigation 
panel review with the Department of Commerce within 60 days after 
the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under 
Section 78-14-8; and Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 1994) provides 
in part: 
(10) "Health care" means any act or 
treatment performed or furnished, or which 
should have been performed or furnished, by 
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical 
care, treatment, or confinement. 
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(11) "Health care provider" includes any 
person, partnership, association, corporation, 
or other facility or institution who causes to 
be rendered or who renders health care or 
professional services as a hospital, 
physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, 
dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical 
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical 
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic 
physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-
language pathologist, clinical social worker, 
certified social worker, social service 
worker, marriage and family counselor, 
practitioner of obstetrics, or others 
rendering similar care and services relating 
to or arising out of the health needs of 
persons or groups of persons and officers, 
employees, or agents of any of the above 
acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a 
health care provider" means any action against 
a health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, 
breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act 
or omission proximately causing injury or 
damage to another. 
(Emphasis added.)1 
xThe definitional section of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act has been amended approximately five times since 
1976. The current version is quoted, and contrary to any 
implication raised by plaintiff, all versions support the trial 
court's decision below. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is an appeal from the trial court's awarding of summary 
judgment to defendants essentially on the grounds that as a matter 
of law and based upon the undisputed material facts defendants were 
health care providers under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3, plaintiff's 
action constituted a malpractice action governed by the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act and the Court was thus without jurisdiction 
since plaintiff had failed to comply with statutory prerequisites 
to suit. (R. at 1557-58, 1568-69.) 
B. Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below. 
On April 5, 1991, plaintiff initiated his complaint in this 
matter against defendants. (See R. 2-21.) In their answer 
defendants admitted that Turnabout was licensed by the State of 
Utah as a day treatment program. (R. 24 at H 3.) 
After significant discovery had been completed relative to 
the legal issue raised, defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment on April 14, 1993, claiming in part that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction since plaintiff had failed to comply with 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 871-72 
(motion) and R. 643-834 (memorandum with supporting exhibits).) 
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment 
essentially determining that defendants are health care providers 
as defined under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, plaintiff's 
action was one for medical malpractice and plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
(R. at 1557-58, 1569.) 
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After plaintiff initiated this appeal, defendants cross-
designated the transcript of the trial court's August 23, 1993 
hearing and the trial court granted defendants' motion to require 
appellant to request the transcript and to pay for the same. 
(R. 1587-93.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Introductory Note 
Since counsel for defendants on appeal is the same counsel 
that prepared and submitted argument for defendants below and 
inasmuch as defendants view the arguments and factual analysis 
presented below as supportive of this Court's affirmance of summary 
judgment, defendants substantially rely upon the same and for ease 
in this Court's review may quote extensively from those facts and 
arguments without reflecting quote marks or indented paragraphs. 
1. On April 5, 1991, plaintiff filed his action against 
defendants in this case. (R. 2-21.) As part of that complaint 
plaintiff essentially admitted and alleged: 
[a.] . . . Turnabout is organized to 
serve the public as a support and self help 
entity for families and to serve the public as 
a crisis intervention program. Turnabout is 
licensed by the State of Utah as a day 
treatment program. [R. at 3 U 3.] 
[b.] On or about June 21, 1989, 
Plaintiff signed a contract with Turnabout for 
the treatment of Gary Platts. [R. at 5 H 18.] 
[c] . . . Turnabout failed to provide 
the treatment called for by the contract thus 
materially breaching its contract with 
Plaintiff. [R. at 8 H 44.] 
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[d.] Turnabout, Comins Defendants John 
Does . . . owed a duty of care to Plaintiff 
and Gary Platts in the care and treatment of 
Gary* [R. at 8 H 47.] 
[e.] Gary Platts was receiving care and 
treatment from Turnabout for behavior problems 
that included running away, truancy. 
depression, substance use and feelings of 
inadequacy. [R. at 8-9, H 48.] 
[f] Without consulting plaintiff and in 
violation of Turnabout policies defendants 
. . . released Gary to go to school . . . 
[after which he ran and committed suicide] 
knowing of his depression, feelings of 
inadequacy, marijuana use and tendencies to 
run away. [R. at 9 1f 52.] 
[g] By releasing Gary Platts 
Turnabout failed to provide the treatment 
called for by the contract. [R. at 8 U 44.] 
(Emphasis added.) 
2. Two years after plaintiff filed this lawsuit in this 
matter and after lengthy and detailed discovery, defendants filed 
their motion for summary judgment with supporting memorandum and 
exhibits. (R. 871-72 (motion) and R. 643-834 (memorandum with 
supporting exhibits).) 
3. In that memorandum, defendants set forth 35 pages of 
undisputed facts supportive of the claims that: (1) defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment since plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
as prerequisites to suit and the trial court thus lacked 
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's case; and (2) defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment since plaintiff could not prove his 
theories of recovery given the undisputed material facts when 
6 
considered with the applicable rule of law. (See R. 643-98 (and 
exhibits attached thereto).) 
4. As to defendants' jurisdictional argument, the court was 
provided undisputed facts of record demonstrating in part: 
[a.] The purpose of Parents Helping 
Parents [dba Turnabout] was to benefit the 
mental health of the community. 
[b.] . . . Turnabout is a community 
based health treatment program for youth 
exhibiting out of control behaviors. [R. at 
670.] 
[c. Turnabout dealt in this case with 
issues involving] using illegal substances or 
alcohol. [R. 671.] 
(R. at 669-71 and cited exhibits thereto (emphasis added).) 
5. In defendants' reply memorandum to plaintiff's objection 
to summary judgment, the court was provided additional undisputed 
record facts and evidence dispositive of defendants' jurisdictional 
claim:2 
(a) [Turnabout's director Jack Wiseman] had 
certification through the Utah 
Association of Alcoholism and Drug 
Addiction Counselors. (See Wiseman 
Deposition attached hereto as Exhibit 2, 
at p. 5 (hereinafter "Wiseman 
Deposition").) 
(b) [Defendant Alan Comins] is a Certified 
Addictions Counselor with the Utah 
Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Counselors and a National Certification 
Addictions Counselor through the National 
Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
2A11 parenthetical citations in this extended and indented 
quote (pp, 7-14, infra) are to exhibits attached to defendants' 
reply memorandum at R. 1170-1226 and were presented to the trial 
court as part of defendants' motion. For clarity and brevity, 
certain paragraphs have been renumbered and combined. 
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Counselors. (See Comins Deposition, 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at pp. 8 
and 9 (hereinafter "Comins Deposition").) 
(c) Mr. Comins views himself as a mental 
health care professional and defendants 
fall under the Division of Social 
Services licensing and under the Mental 
Health and Drug and Alcohol aspect 
thereof. (See Comins Deposition at p. 
10.) 
(d) The requirements for being employed at 
Turnabout during 1989 and 1990 in part 
generally required individuals [to have a 
bachelors degree in sociology or 
psychology] to have professional 
knowledge in four or five selected areas, 
including behavior management, social 
work and psychology, or to have had a 
background in working in and around 
youths having problems and individuals 
with personal recovery history. (See 
Wiseman deposition at p. 20; Comins 
Deposition at pp. 70-71.) 
(e) At the time of the incidents in question, 
Mary McGee was a Licensed Clinical Social 
Worker and Clinical Director of 
Turnabout. (See Comins Deposition at p. 
25; Wiseman Deposition at p. 20.) 
(f) Mary McGee supervised rTurnabout'si 
clinical staff and was involved in 
clinical intervention. (See Wiseman 
Deposition at pp. 31-32.) 
(g) Turnabout had relationships with outside 
health care professionals as well. (See 
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 74-75.) 
(h) Turnabout is a community based day 
treatment program and performs all the 
services in the core definitions and 
rules of the Division of Family Services, 
Office of Licensing. (See Comins 
Deposition at pp. 23-24.) 
(i) Turnabout was doing anything that would 
benefit the general mental health of the 
community. (See Comins Deposition at p. 
13.) 
(j) Turnabout provides counselling services. 
(See Wiseman Deposition at p. 73.) 
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(k) Turnabout performed psychological tests 
on the youth in the programs. (See 
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 87-88.) 
(1) Turnabout performs intake evaluations 
including social, health, family, 
psychological, and developmental. (See 
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 99-100.) 
(m) Turnabout performed psycho-social 
assessments. (See Wiseman Deposition at 
p. 102.) 
(n) Turnabout provided treatment plans for 
its clients. (See Wiseman Deposition at 
pp. 165-66.) 
(o) The Turnabout Policies and Procedures 
Manual dated October 1989 . . . indicates 
that [Turnabout's] Executive Director 
must assume responsibility for the young 
people in the program as well as perform 
other duties as necessary. The program 
also acknowledges the existence of 
Turnabout's Director of Clinical 
Services. (See Exhibit 3 at pp 4-7.) 
(p) . . . [In the] Affidavit of Ken Stettler, 
a licensing specialist with the State of 
Utahf Department of Human Services, 
Licensing Division. • . .Mr. Stettler 
states: 
As a Licensing Specialist for the 
Department of Human Services, since 
[October] of 1989, I have had the 
authority and responsibility of 
reviewing, monitoring and licensing 
youth treatment programs statewide. 
During this time I have licensed the 
Turnabout program to provide day 
treatment services to adolescent 
consumers ages 13 to 18. As defined 
in the Human Service Code, UCA 62A-
2-101(6) states; 
"Day treatment" means 
specialized treatment for less 
than 24 hours a day for four or 
more persons who are unrelated 
to the owner or provider and 
who have e m o t i o n a l , 
psychological, developmental, 
physical, or behavioral 
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dysfunctions, impairments, or 
chemical dependencies. 
In order for a day treatment program 
to be licensed by this Department, 
the program must meet the core and 
categorical rules for treatment as 
specified in the Utah Administrative 
Code R501-2, and R501-3-3. These 
rules indicate the minimum standards 
to which a program must adhere in 
order to maintain a license to 
provide treatment services. 
In the case of the Turnabout 
program, they were first licensed to 
provide day treatment services by 
this Office in November 1988. I 
personally became responsible to 
review, license, and monitor the 
program in October of 1989. Since 
then they have continued to meet the 
standards and maintain a valid State 
license. This license allows all 
staff affiliated with the program to 
provide emotional, psychological, 
behavioral. and mental health care 
to the adolescent consumers 
enrolled. The rendering of this 
care is not limited solely to the 
licensed professionals (i.e. 
physician, psychologist, and social 
worker) , but has been the 
responsibility of all staff in the 
facility, including the program 
administrators. In the Turnabout 
program all of the staff work as a 
team to meet the treatment needs of 
the program participants. It should 
be noted that even though it is not 
required by rule, the program 
directors of Turnabout have always 
been certified as addiction 
counselors for as long as I have 
been reviewing the program. 
Although this certification is not 
considered a professional license by 
State statute, it does carry with it 
the implication that the holder of 
the certificate has specific skills 
and responsibilities in providing 
counseling to persons with 
addictions problems. Such is the 
case at the Turnabout program. 
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(See Exhibit 4.) 
. . . [The trial court was also provided 
with] the Affidavit of Loretta Garcia, an 
Officer of the Department of Commerce, 
Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. Ms. Garcia is in part 
responsible for application of the Health 
Care Malpractice Act and the Pre-
Litigation Panel hearing requirements 
included therein. Ms. Garcia has 
testified in similar affidavit form as 
follows: 
In answer to your question as to 
whether Turnabout Day Treatment 
Program is subject to the Medical 
Malpractice Prelitigation Hearings 
process, I have reviewed the Utah 
Code Ann., Section 78-14. 
Specifically, 78-14-3(8) , 78-14-
3(9), 78-14-3(10), 78-14-12(1)(a) 
and 78-14-12(1)(c) read: 
78-14-3(8) "Health care" means 
[definition quoted from Act]. 
78-14-3(9) "Health care 
provider" includes [definition 
quoted from Act]. 
78-14-3(10) [Act quoted]. 
78-14-12(1)(a) The Department 
of Commerce shall provide a 
hearing panel in alleged 
medical malpractice cases 
against health care providers 
as defined in Section 78-14-3 
filed after July 1, 1985, 
except dentists. 
78-14-12(1)(c) The proceedings 
are informal and nonbinding, 
but are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to 
commenc ing litigation. 
Proceedings conducted under 
authority of this [s]ection are 
confidential, privileged, and 
immune from civil process. 
Psychology, Social Work and Marriage 
and Family Therapy are professions 
regulated by the Mental Health 
11 
Regulatory Acts and Practices. 
Therefore, any legal action taken 
against Turnabout Day Treatment 
Program, which falls under those 
categories, would be required to 
follow the process put in place by 
the legislature, which is to proceed 
with the Prelitigation Hearing. 
I have been serving as the Prelitigation 
Specialist coordinating this program 
since October 1987 and during that time 
we have had hearings requested on almost 
every health care field defined in 78-14-
3. 
(See Exhibit 5.) 
Attached as Exhibit 6 [to defendants' 
reply memorandum] is a letter dated 
August 28, 1989 from the State of Utah, 
Department of Social Services, Office of 
Licensing addressed to Alan Comins and 
Turnabout indicating that defendants 
maintain a Social Services license. 
Therein a core and categorical checklist 
was referenced, which checklist will be 
discussed below. 
Defendants' licensing was [repeatedly] 
renewed as reflected in Exhibit 6 and the 
approval as reflected in Exhibit 7 [to 
defendants' reply memorandum]. 
Exhibit 8 [to defendants' memorandum] 
reflects that the services Turnabout 
provides include comprehensive day 
treatment and human services. 
Exhibit 9 [to defendants' memorandum] is 
part of a Day Treatment Rules Checklist 
of the Utah Department of Social 
Services, Office of Licensing, and was 
completed by Mr. Stettler for defendants. 
That checklist in part reflects that 
defendants provide day treatment activity 
which includes behavioral training, 
community living skills, work activity, 
work adjustment, recreation, self-
feeding, self-care, toilet training, 
social appropriateness, development of 
gross and fine motor skills, 
interpersonal adjustment, mobility 
training, self-sufficiency training, to 
encourage optimal mental or physical 
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function, speech, audiology, physical 
therapy, and psychological services, 
counseling and socialization. 
Exhibit 10 [attached to defendants' reply 
memorandum] reflects defendants' 
additional licensure as do Exhibits 11, 
12, 13 and 14. 
Day treatment is defined by section 
101(6) of chapter 2 (Licensure of 
Programs and Facilities) under title 62A 
(Human Services Code) as follows: 
"Day treatment" means specialized 
treatment for less than 24 hours a 
day for four or more persons who are 
unrelated to the owner or provider 
and who have emotional , 
psychological, developmental, 
physical or behavioral dysfunctions, 
impa i rme n t s or c hemic a 1 
dependencies. Day treatment is 
provided in lieu of, or in 
coordination with, a more 
restrictive residential inpatient 
environment or service. 
R501 of the Utah Department of Human 
Services, Office of Licensing governs the 
core and categorical rules of treatment 
for day treatment centers including 
defendants herein. Subsection III.D., 
para. 1 thereof in part covers 
accreditation and references that "the 
Office may accept accreditation by a 
nationally recognized organization, e.g., 
Joint Commission, Commission or 
Accreditation of Rehabilitation 
Facilities as compliance with these rules 
for licensure." (See Exhibit 15.) 
Section III.B. of the Department's rules 
sets forth the requirements for core 
standards or "the license requirements 
with which Human Service Programs must 
comply" and allows for the governing body 
of the Day Treatment Center to be a Board 
of Directors in a non-profit 
organization. (See Exhibit 15.) Section 
C.III.D. of the Categorical Standard 
Section of those rules allows for the 
following program: 
Day Treatment activity plans shall 
be prepared to meet individual 
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consumer needs. Daily activity 
plans may include behavioral 
training, community living skills, 
work activity, work adjustment, 
recreation, self-feeding, self-care, 
toilet training, social 
appropriateness, development of 
gross and fine motor skills, inter-
personal adjustment, mobility 
training, self-sufficiency training, 
and to encourage optimal mental or 
physical function, speech, 
audiology, physical therapy, and 
psychological services, counseling, 
and socialization. 
And subsection III.E.2.b. thereof sets 
forth the requirements for health care in 
the area of substance abuse. (See 
Exhibit 15.) Finally, section I of the 
Department's Rules defines the term 
"treatment/service plan" as "a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e , t i m e - l i m i t e d , 
goal-oriented, individualized plan for 
care, treatment, and education of 
consumer in care. This service plan is 
based on a current comprehensive 
evaluation of the consumer's needs." 
(R. at 1145-55 (and exhibits attached thereto at R. 1170-1226).) 
(Emphasis added•) 
6. On August 23, 1993, the court held a hearing in this 
matter on pending motions. In addressing summary judgment, the 
court was cited to further factual information before it including 
what may be viewed as plaintiff's admissions in his own deposition 
that defendants indicated they essentially had associates in social 
worker or psychology (actually psychiatry) involved in the program 
with his son and that plaintiff evidently believed and had 
complained that it was Turnabout and Alan Comins' fault that the 
defendant did not provide 24-hour residential treatment for his 
son. (R. at 1613 (citing R. 737, 757).) 
7. The court was also informed and cited to the relevant 
sources demonstrating the undisputed facts that (a) Turnabout's 
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clinical director was a licensed clinical social worker; (b) she 
had provided appropriate treatment modalities for Turnabout 
participants; (c) she had provided clinical supervision for staff 
alcohol and abuse counselors (R. 1657); (d) the declaratory 
judgment action against Turnabout had no bearing in this case as 
defendants had had no right to argue therein and the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction had not been at issue (R. 1609); 
(e) although defendants had asked plaintiff in interrogatories to 
more explicitly detail plaintiff's allegation under the complaint, 
plaintiff chose not to answer the interrogatories to discount any 
allegation that defendants were providing treatment to plaintiff 
(R. 1612-13); (f) in order to be a Utah licensed day treatment 
program Turnabout had a staff of physicians (R. 1622); (g) as part 
of its license from the Utah Department of Social Services, 
defendants could provide, among other things, work adjustment, 
social appropriateness, interpersonal adjustment, self-sufficiency 
training, psychological services and counseling (R. 1657); (h) 
Turnabout's clinical director (a licensed clinical social worker) 
had participated in clinical intervention with plaintiff's son (R. 
1659); (i) plaintiff's own exhibits to his memorandum demonstrated 
that defendants had on-staff psychiatrists, a psychologist, a 
social worker, psychological resident and a marriage and family 
therapist (R. 1659); (j) documents provided by plaintiff to the 
court included treatment plans reflecting treatment Turnabout 
provided to plaintiff's son (R. 1659); and (k) the treatment plans 
Turnabout maintained for plaintiff's son were signed by defendants' 
clinical director, Mary Magie, a licensed clinical social worker 
(R. 1661). 
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8. In the hearing before the court on summary judgment, 
plaintiff through his counsel also essentially admitted in part 
that: (1) if defendants are health care providers, plaintiff's 
lawsuit fails (R. 1636); (2) Utah's Human Services regulatory 
scheme uses the term "treatment" for the day treatment services 
Turnabout provided (R. 1641); (3) plaintiff had attempted to obtain 
a supplemental affidavit from the Utah Division of Professional 
Licensing to contradict Turnabout's claim that it was a health care 
provider but the director thereof had refused plaintiff's request 
since the director allegedly wanted the Division of Professional 
Licensing to be able to regulate Turnabout (R. 1642); (4) Turnabout 
had provided tests for plaintiff's son including a personality or 
MMPI test (R. 1645); and (5) Turnabout was licensed by the 
Department of Social Services (R. 1646, 1648). Plaintiff himself 
was present in court when these "admissions" were essentially made 
on his behalf, Cf. R. 1631 (reference to Mr. Platts in court). 
9. On July 16, 1993, defendants submitted an additional 
affirmative defense to their proposed amended complaint further 
clarifying that plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was governed 
by the conditions and limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. (R. 1357.) 
10. After taking the matter under advisement, the court 
issued its minute entry as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer 
to More Expressly State Affirmative Defense 
that defendants are health care providers is 
granted. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth 
in defendants' Memorandum in Support and in 
Reply thereto, limited however to this Court's 
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determination that defendants are "health care 
providers" as defined by the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act, thereby depriving this Court 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
(R. 1557-58, 1569.) 
11. After plaintiff filed his notice of appeal in this 
matter, defendants filed their motion to require appellant to 
request the transcript of the court's hearing and pay for the same. 
(R. 1573-77.) The court was advised that a transcript of oral 
argument on August 23, 1993, was necessary in order to fully advise 
this Court as to claims plaintiff was going to raise on appeal. 
(R. 1576.) The trial court granted this motion. (R. 1587, 1590, 
1592.) 
12. In his brief on appeal plaintiff has again essentially 
conceded that this case was instituted after plaintiff had signed 
a contract with defendant for the "treatment" of his son and that 
plaintiff's injuries resulted from defendants7 failure to 
essentially confine his son (see plaintiff's brief at p. 2). 
Plaintiff has not raised any argument on appeal that the trial 
court erred in allowing defendants to amend their complaint. (See 
plaintiff's brief.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment should be affirmed on appeal since the trial 
court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 
plaintiff's case due to plaintiff's failure to comply with 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act before suing 
defendants, health care providers, for treatment and confinement 
plaintiff claims should have been rendered and provided to his son. 
Alternatively, this Court can affirm the trial court's 
granting of summary judgment since even if this case does not 
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involve provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
plaintiff could not prove his theories of recovery given undisputed 
material facts when considered with the applicable rules of law. 
In other respects, the trial court did not clearly abuse its 
discretion in requiring plaintiff to request and pay for a 
transcript of the court's hearing since in that hearing plaintiff 
essentially admitted facts and claims—descriptions of which were 
necessary for this Court's complete review. 
Finally, plaintiff's miscellaneous allegations in his brief 
are either erroneous, incomplete or not sufficient bases for 
reversal on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND BASED UPON UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION 
AND THUS CORRECTLY AWARDED DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Statement of Review. 
As noted to the trial court below at R. 155-57, although 
plaintiff has identified the general standard for review of summary 
judgment issues, that standard is not completely stated. Even if 
there are factual disputes (defendants claim there is no dispute 
here as to material facts), this Court can conclude that summary 
judgment is appropriate when the moving parties are entitled to 
relief as a matter of law. For example, if the law does not 
recognize a duty as alleged, disputed facts regarding the breach of 
an alleged duty are irrelevant and summary judgment is appropriate. 
See Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987) 
(in case involving summary judgment, "It is axiomatic that one may 
not be liable to another in tort absent a duty. The question of 
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whether a duty exists is a question of law." (Footnotes 
omitted.)). Whether defendants are health care providers as 
defined by Utah statute and based upon sworn evidence also should 
be viewed a question of law. Cf. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 
445, 446 (Utah 1982) (statute applied according to literal 
wording). 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has declared that 
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (identical to the Utah R. Civ. P. 56) is an efficient way 
of concluding litigation in a "just, speedy and inexpensive" 
manner. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
Summary judgment is thus properly granted against a plaintiff who 
fails to establish the essential elements of his case for which he 
bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. 
In quoting an earlier case, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Court explained the standard: 
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil 
case moves for summary judgment . . . based on 
the lack of proof of a material fact, the 
judge must ask himself not whether he thinks 
the evidence unmistakably favors one side or 
the other but whether a fair-minded jury could 
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the 
evidence presented. The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence in support of the 
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; 
there must be evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The 
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks 
whether reasonable jurors could find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. 
Id. at 252 (emphasis added). Likewise, a party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is 
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita 
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Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 
(1986). This triad of Supreme Court cases clearly establishes the 
desirability of summary judgment under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and 
(by analogy under Utah R. Civ. P. 56) as a means of resolving cases 
which requires more than hypothetical arguments or speculative 
propositions to prevail. 
In applying the established case law to the facts, the trial 
court correctly awarded summary judgment as a matter of law and 
plaintiff otherwise had raised no claim against defendants which 
could be presented to a jury through more than an insufficient 
scintilla of evidence. 
B. The Express Statutory Provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act Control in This Case, and Since Defendants Are 
Health Care Providers, the Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act controls in this case and necessitated 
the awarding of summary judgment to the defendants upon those 
grounds set forth in defendants' memoranda filed below. As 
plaintiff, through his counsel, has essentially admitted, if 
defendants are health care providers, plaintiff's claim fails. 
(Compare R. at 1636 ("[Plaintiff] will submit, if [defendants] are 
a health care provider [sic] and if they were a health care 
provider [sic] when this lawsuit was filed, they get to walk. It 
is as easy as that . . . . [Plaintiff] can't hold them accountable 
for Gary [Platts'] death."), with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-8, -12 
(statutory prerequisite to suit); see also Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 
P.2d 471, 475 n. 2 (Utah App. 1989) (courts applying agency 
principles consistently find client bound by acts of attorney 
within scope of attorney's authority); Rackham v. Rackham, 230 P.2d 
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566, 570 (Utah 1951) (since plaintiff in court when her counsel 
made oral stipulation and she made no objection, she acquiesced in 
her counsel's action and objection on appeal was inadequate).) 
The trial court was thus required to apply plaintiff's 
allegations and the undisputed evidence of record to the 
definitions of "health care," "health care provider," and 
"malpractice action" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3.3 
In trying to avoid defendants' award of summary judgment, 
plaintiff claimed below that "the services provided by Turnabout 
were not health care services, nor were the people providing the 
services health care providers or even professionals. Rather, the 
people providing the services were recovering alcoholics, trying to 
pass themselves off as 'help' for unsuspecting parents" (see R. 
889). Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to offer to the trial court 
any competent evidentiary support for this claim and in fact 
presented evidence and allegations compelling summary judgment. In 
contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994)4 defines a 
health care provider as including 
any person, partnership, association, 
corporation, or other facility or institution 
who causes to be rendered or who renders 
health care or professional services as a 
hospital, physician, registered nurse, 
3Since plaintiff has not appealed the trial court's granting 
of defendants' motion to amend their answer to further clarify an 
affirmative defense, the issue as to whether defendants could 
properly file a motion for summary judgment (arguing the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction) is not before this Court. Regardless, 
defendants were entitled at any time to raise the issue that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction for plaintiff's failure to comply 
with provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See 
generally Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (1992). 
4See footnote 1, supra, p. 3. 
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licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, 
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, 
clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic 
physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-
language pathologist, certified social worker, 
social service worker, social service aide, 
marriage and family counselor, practitioner of 
obstetrics, or others rendering similar care 
and services relating to or arising out of the 
health needs of persons or groups of persons 
and officers, employees, or agents of any of 
the above acting in the course and scope of 
their employment, 
(Emphasis added.) 
Importantly, as this Court has held, the interpretation of a 
statute presents a question of law which is not for the jury's 
determination. See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (1992). And, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, a statute should be applied 
according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable; and it must be assumed that each term in the statute 
was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning 
and in harmony with the other provisions within an act since it is 
not the duty of the courts to assess the wisdom of the statutory 
scheme. See West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982) . 
Applying these standards to the case at hand clearly 
demonstrates that the trial court correctly ruled that defendants 
are health care providers within the meaning of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act. Certainly defendants are persons and 
associations who render health care or professional services such 
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as those of a Certified Social Worker, Social Service Worker, 
Social Service Aide or Family Counselor, "or others rendering 
similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health 
needs of persons or groups of persons." See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994). Also, that section defines health care 
providers as " officers. employees or agents of any of the above 
acting in the course and scope of their employment." 
Interestingly, in essentially making his argument that defendants 
should not be deemed health care providers since they are not 
"licensed" by the state (see plaintiff's brief generally at pp. 10-
13) plaintiff has ignored (1) that defendants are health care 
providers within the definition of "others rendering similar care 
or services" to those professions listed; (2) that Section 
78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994) defining "health care provider" does not 
state (as plaintiff suggests) that a license is required for those 
rendering "similar care or services"; (3) that if Turnabout is a 
health care provider, defendant Comins and other employees are 
protected by the above-emphasized clause "officers, employees or 
agents"; and (4) that Turnabout is licensed by the State of Utah to 
provide day treatment services including psychological and 
counseling services (R. 1200-1201) and thus, even under plaintiff's 
erroneous view of licensure, is a health care provider protected by 
the Act. 
Under statutory definitions, then, both Alan Comins and 
Turnabout are health care providers. Further support for this 
conclusion results from the fact that plaintiff has already 
admitted Turnabout had a licensed clinical social worker on staff 
(see R. at 884), and the undisputed evidence of record clearly 
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demonstrated she was defendants' clinical director (supra p. 8 
11(e)). In addition, the sworn affidavits of Ken Stettler (a 
licensing specialist for Utah's Department of Human Services (supra 
pp. 9-10)) and Loretta Garcia (an officer of Utah's Department of 
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(supra pp. 11-12)) presented below belie plaintiff's contention 
that defendants are not entitled to protection under the Health 
Care Malpractice Act. Specifically, as a licensing specialist with 
the State Department of Social Services, Ken Stettler has 
essentially defined defendants as health care providers and 
testified that licenses were issued for the social-service-type 
health care defendants provide, which licenses entitled Turnabout 
and even its unlicensed professionals to provide emotional, 
psychological, behavioral and mental health care to plaintiff's son 
and others. (R. 1200-1201.) Similarly, as an officer of the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing which "manages" 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Loretta Garcia essentially 
indicated that defendants are health care providers within the 
provisions of that Act and are entitled to rely on its provisions 
and seek its protection. (R. 1203-1204.) 
Certainly, the day-treatment license that has been awarded to 
defendants mandates that defendants be viewed as health care 
providers since day treatment is statutorily defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-1-101(6) as involving emotional, psychological, 
development, physical or behavioral dysfunction impairments or 
chemical dependencies. (See R. 1205, 1209-18.) Also, the Core and 
Categorical Rules for Treatment utilized by the State Department of 
Human Services (licensing defendant Turnabout) indicate that that 
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state office may accept accreditation by nationally recognized 
organizations (such as the National Association of Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse Counselors of which defendant Comins and Turnabout's director 
are members) (R. 1220) and the rules of Utah's Human Services 
Department allow for defendants' daily activity "treatment plans" 
to include "behavioral training, community living skills, work 
activity, work adjustment, recreation, self-feeding, self-care, 
toilet training, social appropriateness, development of gross and 
fine motor skills, interpersonal adjustment, mobility training, 
self-sufficiency training, and to encourage optimal mental or 
physical function, speech, audiology, physical therapy, and 
psychological services, counseling, and socialization." (See R. 
1209, 1219-24.) 
In short, plaintiff offered no competent credible evidence to 
raise a question of fact as to whether defendants are health care 
providers; and as a matter of law, the trial court correctly ruled 
that such is the case. 
C. Plaintiff's Own Factual Admissions Demonstrate That the Trial 
Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment. 
Importantly, plaintiff has not acknowledged in his brief on 
appeal all of the factual admissions identified in his papers filed 
with the court below or made in plaintiff's statements in open 
court, through plaintiff's counsel, on August 23, 1993. (See, 
e.g. , statement of facts, supra, pp. 15-16 at 1f1f 7-8.) 
Specifically, the very exhibits plaintiff filed with the court 
to avoid summary judgment demonstrate the appropriateness thereof. 
For example (1) Turnabout's treatment plan for plaintiff's son 
outlines behavioral modification goals and social work issues and 
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is signed by Turnabout's clinical director, a licensed clinical 
social worker (R. 1089-90), (2) defendants' amendments to their 
articles of incorporation demonstrate that among other things they 
run programs that benefit the general mental health of the 
community and provide "intervention, treatment and after care of 
youth with alcohol/drug problems and/or behavior problems" (R. 
1096), (3) Turnabout's advertising provides that it is offering 
"comprehensive day treatment and human services" (R. 1105), and 
Turnabout provides social services work (R. 1109), (4) the contract 
between plaintiff and defendants demonstrates that defendants were 
entitled to address medical treatment and testing, guidance-type 
discipline and restraint for plaintiff's son (R. 1110), (5) regular 
social work-type progress notes were kept on plaintiff's son and 
reviewed and signed off by Turnabout's clinical director, Mary 
Magie, a licensed clinical social worker (R. 1112-18), and (6) 
program job descriptions provided by plaintiff to the trial court 
also demonstrate that defendants' director of clinical services (a 
licensed clinical social worker) provided supervision over 
Turnabout staff (R. 1131). 
Moreover, if defendants are health care providers, plaintiff 
cannot now credibly dispute on appeal that his claim is a 
malpractice action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Plaintiff essentially admitted this fact to the trial court (R. at 
1636 quoted at p. 20, supra), and malpractice action is defined as 
"any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise. based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care 
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providers." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1994). Similarly, 
health care "means any act or treatment performed or furnished or 
which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider" including acts related to confinement issues. 
Here, plaintiff has claimed that defendants failed to properly 
treat (see, e.g. , R. at 8; plaintiff's brief at p. 2) and 
essentially confine (see, e.g., R. at 8-9; plaintiff's brief p. 2) 
his son. Thus, plaintiff cannot credibly argue that his claims do 
not surround "any act" which should have been performed by a health 
care provider (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10) (Supp. 1994)) whether 
in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death "or 
otherwise." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1994).) 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ALTERNATIVELY APPROPRIATELY AFFIRM 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE BASED UPON UNDISPUTED FACTS AND 
BINDING CASE LAW PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT BELOW. 
ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY FORMING A BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURTS 
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
This Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied 
on below." Higqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 
(citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 
1992) ) . As such, on appeal this Court can conclude that based upon 
additional argument presented to the trial court summary judgment 
was appropriate as a matter of law and based on the undisputed fact 
that plaintiff could not prove his theories of recovery as alleged. 
For a complete analysis of defendants' arguments in this regard, 
this Court is referred to defendants' memoranda below at R. 682-92, 
1162-66. And the Court is further cited to the "undisputed 
statement of facts" supporting that analysis at R. 644-77. To 
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summarize that argument presented to the trial court: Each of 
plaintiff's theories for recovery fail on the merits. 
A. Breach of Contract 
Although in paragraph 44 of plaintiff's complaint plaintiff 
alleges that "by releasing Gary Platts in violation of its own 
policies, Turnabout failed to provide the treatment called for by 
the contract thus materially breaching its contract with plaintiff" 
(R. at 5), plaintiff was unable to prove that any contract agreed 
to by the parties for which consideration was paid included the 
condition that defendants would not allow plaintiff's son, Gary 
Platts, to go to school, after which plaintiff claims his son ran 
away and committed suicide. Rather than producing a contract which 
states that defendants agreed not to allow Gary Platts to attend 
school, plaintiff must have essentially relied upon his own 
allegations in paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of his complaint: 
15. Turnabout represented that it 
"offers the personnel to check or verify that 
youth are where they should be, when they 
should be." 
16. Turnabout further represented that 
"[i]f a youth has run away, we will look for 
him or her; truant from school, we will 
monitor him or her; abusive in the home, we'll 
come there." 
18. On or about June 21, 1989, Plaintiff 
signed a contract with Turnabout for the 
treatment of Gary Platts. This contract 
called for payment of $5,400.00, payable 
$1,500.00 dollars down and $325.00 per month 
for 12 consecutive months beginning August 1, 
1989, in return for said treatment. A true 
and correct copy of said contract is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated by 
this reference. 
(R. at 4-5.) 
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However, even if plaintiff's allegations in paragraphs 15 and 
16 of the complaint are accurate, this is not a binding contractual 
obligation for which Gary Platts' suicide demonstrates a breach. 
Further, evidently no contract was attached to the court's copy of 
plaintiff's complaint and the "Exhibit A" to which plaintiff 
referred the contract in no way provides that defendants agreed not 
to allow Gary Piatts to go to school* Accordingly, there can be no 
claim for breach of contract under the applicable document, and 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment thereon. 
B. Negligence 
To support plaintiff's claim of negligence, he alleged: 
50. On or about February 22, 1990, John 
Does I through XX reviewed the treatment of 
Gary Platts and the request of Plaintiff to 
take Gary out of the program and decided 
against releasing Gary Platts from "24 hour 
residential treatment." 
51. On February 24, 1990, Turnabout told 
Plaintiff that Gary was not ready to be 
released. 
52. Without consulting Plaintiff and in 
violation of Turnabout policies, Defendants 
Turnabout, Comins and John Does I - XXV 
released Gary to go to school on February 27, 
1990 knowing of his depression, feelings of 
inadequacy, marijuana use and tendencies to 
run away. 
53. The release of Gary Platts by the 
Defendants breached the duty of care owed 
Plaintiff and Gary Platts. 
54. The release of Gary Platts was a 
direct and proximate cause of Gary Piatt's 
[sic] death. 
(R. at 9.) Notwithstanding these allegations, however, the 
undisputed material facts clearly established that by his own 
admission plaintiff at all times himself maintained custody over 
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his son and was responsible for him even when his son was 
participating in the Turnabout program (see R. at 737, 741-42, 
quoted at R. 653-55) (which was only during the day on hours when 
the children were not attending school). While plaintiff may claim 
that Turnabout was a 24-hour residential treatment program, he 
admitted that that may have only been his description of the 
program (see R. at p. 757, quoted at R. 657), and testimony of 
defendants' two directors reflected that theirs was not a 24-hour 
treatment program. (See, e.g., R. at 780, quoted at R. 663; 810-
811, quoted at R. 670.) Further, contrary to plaintiff's 
allegation that Turnabout never told plaintiff that Gary was not 
ready to be released (see Complaint at H 51, R. at 9) defendants 
did not have custody of Gary and the decision of "releasing" was 
not theirs to make, which fact plaintiff has essentially admitted 
(see R. 760). Further, any "release" of Gary Platts by the 
defendants could not have breached any duty of care proximately 
causing plaintiffs claimed injuries since those injuries were 
caused by Gary Platts' own intentional acts in shooting himself. 
See generally Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 
488 (Utah App. 1991) (unforeseeable superseding act relieves 
defendant of liability for any original negligence). Defendants 
could not foresee that Gary Platts' trip to school would result in 
his suicide days later. Accordingly, plaintiff's theory for 
negligence fails. 
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In Retherford v. A T & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 
1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that to sustain a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress plaintiff must show 
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that "(i) [defendant's] conduct was outrageous and intolerable and 
that it offended against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality; (ii) [defendant] intended to cause or acted 
in reckless disregard of a likelihood of causing emotional 
distress; (iii) [plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress; and 
(iv) [defendant's] conduct proximately caused [plaintiff's] 
emotional distress." (Id. at 970-71 (citation omitted).) Applying 
this standard and these elements to the undisputed statement of 
facts clearly demonstrate that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that a jury could conclude that defendants' conduct was 
"outrageous and intolerable and that it offended against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Retherford, 
supra. 
Indeed, plaintiff essentially claims that defendants' 
impermissible conduct consisted of allowing plaintiff's son to go 
to school. Even if this accurate, allowing Gary Platts to go to 
school during a time when plaintiff retained custody over his son 
was not outrageous, intolerable, or offending against generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. Further, there is no 
evidence that defendants intended to cause or acted in reckless 
disregard of the likelihood of causing plaintiff Ron Platts 
emotional distress by allowing Gary Platts to go to school, when 
such conduct did not proximately cause plaintiff's alleged 
emotional distress given the intervening intentional acts of 
plaintiff's son in committing suicide. 
D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
This Court is well aware of those cases establishing the zone 
of danger rule in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. 
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See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988); Boucher v. 
Dixon Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992) (zone of danger 
approach only "allows recovery to plaintiffs who suffer emotional 
distress because of another's negligence, though they do not suffer 
any physical impact, only if the plaintiffs are placed in actual 
physical peril and fear for their own safety") (footnote omitted). 
Certainly plaintiff has not and cannot claim here that he was 
placed in actual physical peril and fear for his own safety. Thus, 
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
must fail. 
E. Failure to Supervise 
In asserting his failure to supervise claim plaintiff alleged: 
72. Gary Platts was a youth participant 
in Turnabout's treatment program. 
73. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff 
to supervise Gary Platts. 
74. Defendants failed to supervise Gary 
Platts. 
75. Defendants' failure to supervise 
Gary Platts directly and proximately resulted 
in the death of Gary Platts. 
R. at 12. 
Nevertheless, applying the undisputed facts provided to the 
trial court (see R. at 644-77) demonstrates that since plaintiff 
categorically admitted that he had custody over his son (see, e.g., 
R. 737, 741-42), it was his duty to supervise Gary Platts and he 
could not informally transfer that custody to another. In 
addition, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that defendants' 
supervision over Gary Platts was limited only to when he was in 
their program and after school (see, e.g., R. at 738 (during 
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evening hours plaintiff took his son home [if he was not staying in 
the home of a parent whose child was also participating in 
defendants' program])). In this case, there is no dispute that 
Gary Platts left for school after staying in the home of another 
(see R. at 5, complaint U 24; R. at 759, quoted at R. 657-58 
(plaintiffs permission for his son to stay with others)) and not 
at defendants' facility and that he never returned to defendants' 
facility (see R. at 7; complaint H 37). There can be no dispute 
then that at the time Gary Platts ran away he was not being 
supervised by defendants as he was at or leaving school. Further, 
even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, this alleged "failure 
to supervise" did not directly and proximately result in 
plaintiff's claimed injuries since Gary Platts' own intervening 
actions resulted in the unfortunate outcome. (See discussion re 
intervening act at p. 30, supra.) 
F. False Advertising 
As his sixth cause of action plaintiff claimed: 
78. In an attempt to solicit business, 
Turnabout and John Does I through XXXV 
published brochures describing the Turnabout 
program. 
79. Included in these brochures are 
representations that "Parents will decide the 
length of time that they wish to be involved 
with the program" and "Turnabout offers the 
personnel to check or verify that youth are 
where they should be, when they should be." 
80. Representations within the brochures 
were false. 
81. Defendant knew these representations 
were false. 
(R. at 13-14.) 
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A specific action or omission which plaintiff essentially 
alleged defendants failed to take was allowing Gary Platts to go to 
school. This claim fails, however, since nowhere in their 
published brochures did defendants guarantee that they would not 
allow plaintiff's son to go to school. In fact, plaintiff has 
admitted that he never told defendants not to send his son to 
school (R. 760, quoted at R. 658). Further, plaintiff's allegation 
that the brochure stated that "Turnabout offers the personnel to 
check or verify the youth are where they should be, when the should 
be" does not advertise that defendants would guarantee that Gary 
Platts would not run away from school and commit suicide. 
G. Fraud 
The sole claim that plaintiff made for fraud is that 
defendants made at least the following representations: 
(a) Parents will decide the length of 
time that they wish to be involved with the 
program; and 
(b) Turnabout offers the personnel to 
check or verify that youth are where they 
should be, when they should be. 
(R. at 15.) These allegations fail, however, since plaintiff did 
not state his claim for fraud with particularity as required by 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Utah 
Supreme Court has restated the elements of fraud as including: 
1. That a representation was made; 
2. Concerning a presently existing 
material fact; 
3. Which was false; 
4. Which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly 
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient 
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knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 
5. For the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; 
6. That the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
7. Did in fact rely upon it; 
8. And was thereby induced to act; 
9. To his [or her] injury and damage. 
Crookstone v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 F.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991) (citations omitted). 
Applying these elements to the case at hand demonstrates that 
plaintiff did not establish that a representation was made which 
was false since plaintiff has admitted that he had custody over his 
child and could therefore decide the time he wished his child to be 
involved in the program (see generally R. at 737 (quoted at R. 653, 
740-41 (quoted at R. 654))). And, although defendants may have 
offered personnel to check or verify youth, that does not mean that 
they would not have allowed a youth to go to school (see 
discussion, supra, pp. 32-34). Further, there is no evidence to 
support the fact that these statements were made to induce 
plaintiff to act and that he acted reasonably and in ignorance of 
their falsity. This is so since any adult must know that if he 
retains custody over a child, he can decide how long the child is 
in the program, and any adult should know that a program such as 
this that only offers assistance during hours when the child is not 
at a home or in school has no authority to take formal custody of 
the youth. Also, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he relied 
upon these statements, was induced to act thereon and was injured 
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thereby since it was the intervening actions of his son that 
resulted in plaintiff's claimed injuries. 
H. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim centered around 
this allegation: 
93. Turnabout and John Does I through XXXV 
negligently misrepresented the circumstance of 
Turnabout by making at least those 
representations detailed in paragraph 82 of 
this Complaint which are incorporated by this 
reference as though fully set forth herein. 
Nevertheless, under Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiff did not state his claim for negligent 
misrepresentation with particularity as required by that rule in 
cases such as Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 
(Utah 1982). 
In sum, the trial court had before it numerous bases upon 
which it could appropriately grant defendants summary judgment in 
this case and to require further litigation in a trial on such 
issues is not merited. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING PLAINTIFF 
TO PAY FOR THE COSTS OF A TRANSCRIPT 
FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The trial court's decision to require plaintiff to request and 
pay for the cost of a transcript for this Court's review was 
appropriate and did not abuse the discretion. Cf. T.S. Partnership 
v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1994) (determination of attorney 
fees within sound discretion of trial court and not overturned 
absent showing of clear abuse of discretion)• 
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In factf a simple review of that transcript sets forth the 
admissions essentially made by plaintiff to the trial court, which 
admissions demonstrate the appropriateness of the trial court's 
award of summary judgment and this Court's affirmance on appeal. 
Specifically, as set forth in defendants' statement of facts 
(supra p. 16, H 8), the transcript in question demonstrates that 
plaintiff (through his counsel) essentially admitted in the hearing 
before the trial court that if defendants are health care 
providers, plaintiff's lawsuit fails (R. 1636). Plaintiff also 
essentially admitted that Utah's human services regulatory scheme 
used the term "treatment" for those services Turnabout provided 
(R. 1641) and plaintiff identified his failed attempts to obtain 
sworn testimony disputing the fact that defendants were health care 
providers (R. 1642). Plaintiff also noted that Turnabout provided 
psychological/personality tests for plaintiff's son (R. 1645) and 
that Turnabout was at all material times licensed by the Department 
of Social Services (R. 1646, 1648). 
As indicated previously, plaintiff is bound by these 
"admissions" as he was present in court when his counsel made the 
same. (See Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 n. 2 (Utah App. 
1989) (courts applying agency principles consistently find client 
bound by acts of attorney within scope of attorney's authority); 
Rackham v. Rackham, 230 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah 1951) (since plaintiff 
in court when her counsel made oral stipulation and she made no 
objection, she acquiesced in her counsel's action and objection on 
appeal was inadequate).) 
The import of plaintiff's "admissions" at the trial court 
level cannot be overstated as they demonstrate the meritless nature 
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of plaintiff's claims in this suit (i.e., Turnabout is licensed by 
the Department of Social Services, thus disputing plaintiff's 
"licensure" argument on appeal), and justify the court's decision 
requiring plaintiff to request and pay for a transcript of that 
hearing. 
Similarly, the transcript is important since a plain review of 
the same demonstrates the misleading claims in plaintiff's brief on 
appeal. For example, on pages 4-5 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff 
asserts that defendants' defense is based on defendants' 
"assumption" that since Comins and his colleague who operated 
Turnabout were credentialed addiction counselors, they and 
Turnabout were health care providers under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. This is not an accurate description of 
defendants' complete argument, and a plain review of that 
transcript (which plaintiff now argues he should not have been 
forced to provide) demonstrates this fact. In short, the 
transcript was insightful for this Court's evaluation on appeal, 
and the trial court correctly ordered plaintiff to request and pay 
for the same. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS MISCELLANEOUS ALLEGATIONS IN HIS BRIEF 
ARE EITHER ERRONEOUS. INCOMPLETE 
OR INSUFFICIENT BASES FOR REVERSAL ON APPEAL 
Arguments and statements plaintiff makes in his brief on 
appeal are either inaccurate or not supportable. For example, on 
page 3 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff claims that defendants "do 
not provide any professional services." Not only is this statement 
without any credible cite to the record, but it is also inaccurate 
as demonstrated above. See supra, pp. 8-10. And plaintiff 
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incredulously and implicitly claims without any support in the 
record and contrary to the transcript that the trial court reached 
its conclusion solely on the basis that since defendant Comins was 
a credentialed addiction counsel he and Turnabout were health care 
providers. (Compare plaintiff's brief at p. 5 with court's ruling 
at R. 1557-58, 1569.) 
Next, although plaintiff erroneously claims that "the 
individuals employed by [Turnabout] do not fit within any of the 
categories provided for by the Act" as health care providers (see 
plaintiff's brief at p. 6), this claim follows directly upon the 
heels of plaintiff's own citation in his brief to the Health Care 
Malpractice Act which defines health care providers in part as 
"officers, employees, agents" of any person or entity rendering 
similar care and services. (See plaintiff's brief at p. 6.) 
Plaintiff also ignores the fact that his own statutory 
construction analysis speaks against the proposition he raises on 
appeal. Specifically, this Court can easily conclude that had the 
Utah legislature intended to restrict the definition of health care 
providers only to those who were "licensed" as plaintiff claims 
(see plaintiff's brief at p. 5), it would have been very easy for 
it to insert that "licensure requirement" into the statute during 
any of the five or six times it has amended that Act since 1976. 
The fact that the legislature chose not to use that term 
demonstrates its intent not to limit the definition of "health care 
providers" only to those who are "licensed." Similarly, 
plaintiff's entire "licensure" analogy fails as a matter of logic. 
Assume plaintiff was injured in a hospital's operating room by a 
"scrub tech" who is not licensed by the state but allowed to assist 
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in surgery. This "scrub tech" would be protected by the Act as a 
licensed health care provider's employee just as defendant Comins 
is protected as an employee of Turnabout where the State of Utah 
has given Turnabout a license to provide health care services (see 
affidavit of Kenneth Stettler at R. 1200-1201), which license 
entitles unlicensed professionals working for Turnabout to provide 
that care (see id,) . 
As demonstrated above, plaintiff's references in his brief to 
exhibits presented to the trial court are also misleading and 
incomplete (see supra pp. 25-26). Further, plaintiff ignores the 
fact that the supplemental affidavit of Kenneth Stettler in no way 
controverts that affidavit supporting the trial court's conclusion 
below. (Compare plaintiff's brief at p. 12 with affidavit at R. 
1200-1201.) Indeed, all plaintiff was essentially able to get 
Mr. Stettler to concede in a material, if relevant, fashion in his 
amended affidavit is that Mr. Comins himself is not licensed by the 
State of Utah. (Mr. Comins remains an employee of a licensed 
provider.) 
Plaintiff likewise has no credible citation to the record that 
treatment at Turnabout was essentially provided for by the peers of 
plaintiff's son. (See plaintiff's brief at p. 13.) And plaintiff 
has no cite to the record for his claim that professional services 
were not included as part of defendants' program fee. (See 
plaintiff's brief at p. 18.) 
Finally, this Court should ignore plaintiff's erroneous and 
misleading claims on pages 19-20 of plaintiff's brief that a 
decision by a different judge in a declaratory judgment lawsuit 
between defendants' insurers and defendants (where the trial 
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court's minute entry simply reflects that a fact issue avoided the 
plaintiff's motion in that case for summary judgment (see R. 1443)) 
somehow bars the trial court's ruling in this case. That is not 
the case and plaintiff's claimed "facts" are without appropriate 
citation to the record and are erroneous in any event,5 Further, 
plaintiff has no basis and has not cited this Court to any evidence 
supportive of his claim that defendants do not have medical 
malpractice insurance (ostensibly because they do not provide 
health care related services) (see plaintiff's brief at p. 5). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court essentially concluded that it was without 
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's case since defendants were health 
care providers and plaintiff had failed to comply with the 
prerequisites of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act before 
initiating his malpractice action. This Court can also affirm the 
trial court on other grounds argued below which do not form a basis 
of the trial court's actual ruling, and the trial court correctly 
required plaintiff to provide a copy of the transcript of the 
argument below, which transcript demonstrates plaintiff's 
admissions supportive of the trial court's ruling and points out 
inaccuracies in plaintiff's brief on appeal. 
5If this Court wishes to consider plaintiff's incorrect 
claim regarding the effect, if any, of a trial court's denial of 
summary judgment in a different case (involving a declaratory 
judgment action by defendants' insurer), this Court should (1) 
allow defendants to supplement the record with the insurer's 
motion for summary judgment arguing the issue of a "professional 
services" exclusion in an insurance policy, which motion did not 
deal with the issues in this case, (2) allow defendants to 
supplement the record with a copy of the hearing transcript in 
the declaratory judgment action, and (3) consider defendants' 
analysis defeating any collateral estoppel claim. See R. at 
1544-45. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 
1995. 
HANSON, EPPE MITH 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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